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 Threading Together Abuse  
of Process and Exclusion of  
Evidence: How it Became Possible  
to Rebuke Mr. Big 
Steve Coughlan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult to say something new about Mr. Big. 
I do not say that only by way of apology for any lack of originality in 
this piece: rather, it is an aspect of my thesis. We have known from the 
very start what it is that is objectionable about the Mr. Big investigative 
technique. Only relatively recently, however, have we developed the 
legal tools to allow us to engage appropriately with that concern as a 
legal issue. As a result, Hart1 and Mack2 are not the last word on Mr. Big: 
rather they are the start of a discussion which is finally beginning to talk 
about the issue in the proper way.3 
                                                                                                                                  
*  Steve Coughlan, Schulich School of Law. I am indebted to a number of people in relation 
to this article, including my students Adrien Iafrate and Suzie Kittell for conversations about their 
own work on abuse of process and on Mr. Big, respectively, to Archie Kaiser for various discussions 
about the issue, and to my research assistant Joanna Schoepp for her excellent background research. 
1  R. v. Hart, [2014] S.C.J. No. 52, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 544, 2014 SCC 52 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Hart”]. 
2  R. v. Mack, [2014] S.C.J. No. 58, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2014 SCC 58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Mack”]. 
3  I do not mean by this to suggest any disrespect to the many people who have written 
about Mr. Big prior to the Supreme Court decision in Hart, such as Nikos Harris, “The Less-
Travelled Exclusionary Path: Sections 7 and 24(1) of the Charter and R. v. Hart” (2014) 7 C.R. (7th) 
287, Amar Khoday, “Scrutinizing Mr. Big: Police Trickery, the Confessions Rule and the Need to 
Regulate Extra-Custodial Undercover Interrogations” (2013) 60 Crim. L.Q. 277, Lisa Dufraimont, 
“R. v. Hart: Building a Screen for Mr. Big Confessions” (2013) 97 C.R. (6th) 104 or Timothy E. 
Moore, Peter Copeland & Regina A. Schuller, “Deceit, Betrayal and the Search for Truth: Legal and 
Psychological Perspectives on the ‘Mr. Big’ Strategy” (2009-10) 55 Crim. L.Q. 348 [hereinafter 
“Moore”]. These helpful and insightful analyses at a time when courts seemed generally uncritical of 
the technique have no doubt contributed to moving us to the position we are now in. For a thorough 
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Hart created a “two-pronged approach” to evaluating Mr. Big 
investigations that:  
(1) recognizes a new common law rule of evidence, and (2) relies on a 
more robust conception of the doctrine of abuse of process to deal with 
the problem of police misconduct.4 
The first prong is forward-looking: it is meant to look at the quality 
of evidence which will be led at trial, in order to ensure that it is reliable 
and will not be unduly prejudicial. The second prong, on the other hand, 
is backward-looking and focuses on the behaviour of the police in 
eliciting the evidence.5 My thesis in this article is that the second prong, 
the backward-looking remedy which addresses police misconduct, is by 
far the more important approach, that we have only relatively recently 
reached a position to pursue that line of argument seriously, and that it is 
the approach that future cases should focus on. 
To pursue this thesis, I will discuss three main threads in Canadian 
law: the nature of Mr. Big and the factors which lead to concerns; the 
history of cases discussing abuse of process; and the history of cases 
discussing exclusion of evidence. I will argue from that discussion that it 
is only in the past few years that our approach to the latter two has 
become sufficiently developed to allow us to come to grips with the real 
issue, the objectionable nature of the police conduct.  
My argument proceeds on the basis that it is important to be alert to 
the “trends” in law, and to recognize that legal argument is as much a 
sociological phenomenon as anything else. I suggest in this article that 
there are trends in the way that both abuse of process and exclusion of 
evidence have been regarded which have made the time ripe for 
discussion of Mr. Big in a way that has not been true in the past.6 I will 
argue in my final section that, as a result of those trends, it is no 
coincidence Hart did not come along sooner than it did, but by that same 
token we should not conclude that the discussion is now over. Rather, 
attention should focus on how to develop the backward-looking abuse of 
process prong of the Court’s approach. 
                                                                                                             
review of the findings in Hart and Mack themselves, see Lisa Dufraimont, “Hart and Mack: New 
Restraints on Mr. Big and A New Approach to Unreliable Prosecution Evidence” in this volume. 
4  Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 84. 
5  Id., at para. 120. 
6  I am indebted to my former colleague Philip Girard’s analogous approach to considering 
the acceptance of same-sex marriage in Canada for causing me to think about the issue in this way. 
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II. THE NATURE OF MR. BIG 
The Supreme Court of Canada notes in Hart that the earliest known 
use of the Mr. Big technique dates to the 1901 decision in R. v. Todd.7 
Interestingly, the discussion in that case generally presages the dilemma 
that has confronted critics of the technique to this day. 
Other than the slight wrinkle that private agents were employed by 
the police to conduct the sting, the approach used in Todd is exactly what 
we now think of as the Mr. Big technique: 
It appears from the statement of the case that Yeddeau and McBean, 
neither of whom was a peace officer, had been specially employed by 
the chief of police as detectives to see if they could procure evidence 
which would connect the prisoner with the murder of Gordon, and that 
they pretended to the prisoner that they belonged to a gang of organized 
criminals, from the operations of which large profits were likely to be 
made, and they offered to make him a member of the gang if he would 
satisfy them that he had committed some serious crime; and it was by 
the influence of this inducement that the prisoner confessed to Yeddeau 
that he had killed Gordon.8 
The issue before the Manitoba Court of Appeal was whether the 
confession should be excluded: they decided that it was admissible. The 
decision held: 
The means employed in this case to obtain the confession were 
contemptible; but it does not seem to be a sufficient ground for 
excluding the evidence.9 
That, in a nutshell, is the debate which has circled around Mr. Big for 
more than a century afterward: something seems fundamentally 
objectionable about it, but no legal doctrine has matched up with that 
intuitive sense. The technique does not, strictly, violate any of our rules, 
and in the absence of a rule violation we have not had a sufficient ability 
to object on a policy basis. 
It is, of course, no coincidence that no legal doctrine has been 
responsive to Mr. Big. As Green C.J.N.L. observed in Hart “the Mr. Big 
strategy has been uniquely structured to avoid the barriers to admissibility 
                                                                                                                                  
7  R. v. Todd, [1901] M.J. No. 1, 4 C.C.C. 514 (Man. C.A.) [hereinafter “Todd”]. 
8  Id., at para. 15. 
9  Id., at para. 8. 
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set up by the traditional rules”.10 It is, I suggest, precisely because the 
technique manages to violate the spirit of so many rules without ever quite 
violating the letter of them that it raises many people’s hackles.11 
Let us look at how our various traditional rules fail to grasp hold of the 
technique. For example, a confession has to be made without fear of 
prejudice or hope of advantage; however, it is exactly the hope of 
advantage (and sometimes the fear of prejudice) which motivates a target’s 
statement in a Mr. Big sting. An offer of a quid pro quo is often seen as the 
thing making a confession suspect, and precisely such an offer exists in 
Mr. Big. However, even though the target is in fact speaking to a person in 
authority, he or she does not know that: as a result the statement is not 
technically a “confession” and the rule excluding it does not apply.12 
The statement is hearsay and thus inadmissible unless it falls within an 
exception. Mr. Big statements are generally admitted as party admissions, 
based on the theory that a party cannot plausibly “complain of the 
unreliability of his or her own statements”.13 However true that assumption 
might be in general, Mr. Big creates unusual circumstances in which there 
are obvious reasons to doubt the reliability of the statement: that is, the 
rationale for the rule does not apply, but the rule applies nonetheless. 
A further hearsay exception sometimes raised is the “statement against 
interest” exception, which admits statements made by a person against his 
or her pecuniary or penal interests. It is seen as acceptable to let in 
statements to the effect of “I committed that crime”, because normally no 
one would say that if it were not true. Of course Mr. Big creates abnormal 
circumstances in which making such a statement becomes in the accused’s 
interests, but based on the general rationale the exception applies.14 
Bad character evidence about the accused cannot normally be 
introduced by the Crown. However, it is routinely admitted in Mr. Big 
cases in order to show the circumstances leading to the accused’s 
confession. The accused, in fact, is required to stress this evidence to the 
                                                                                                                                  
10  R. v. Hart, [2012] N.J. No. 303, 327 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 178, 2012 NLCA 61, at para. 154 
(N.L.C.A.). 
11  As my student Paulina Munroe observed in a class, if an investigative technique can 
make people think “I feel bad about the way the police treated that murderer”, there might be 
something wrong with it. 
12  R. v. Grandinetti, [2005] S.C.J. No. 3, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 27, 2005 SCC 5 (S.C.C.). 
13  Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 63, quoting R. v. Evans, [1993] S.C.J. No. 115, [1993] 3 
S.C.R. 653, at 664 (S.C.C.). 
14  See for example R. v. Osmar, [2007] O.J. No. 244, 84 O.R. (3d) 321, 2007 ONCA 50, at 
paras. 52-53 (Ont. C.A.). This exception applies to non-parties and so would not be directly 
applicable to the accused, but the spirit behind the exception is violated by the technique. 
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jury in order to try to explain away the confession: in effect “I only said 
that because I was a petty felon trying to become a serious career 
criminal.”15 
An accused who is in the control of the state has many rights: a right 
to silence, a right to be free from self-incrimination, and a right to have 
the state not attempt to elicit information from him or her.16 Targets of a 
Mr. Big, on the other hand, are confronted with statements which depart 
from all of those protections, such as “you’re not gonna fuckin’ get [my 
help] unless I get the fuckin’ story”.17 This is seen to be perfectly fine 
because, although as a matter of fact everyone in the room except the 
target is a police officer, the target does not know that.18 Perhaps a better 
way to put that is “the target has been kept deliberately ignorant of the 
fact which would give him or her rights”.  
So that is one major reason that the technique feels objectionable. We 
create legal rules in order to try to make the system fair. The Mr. Big 
technique violates the spirit of many such rules, but the evidence is 
admitted nonetheless. 
There are other aspects of the technique which make people 
uncomfortable. These include the behaviour in which the target is led to 
engage, the behaviour in which the police operatives engage, and the 
potential impact of the technique on the target and others. 
Let us consider the behaviour in which the target is led to engage. It 
is common to say that the Mr. Big technique causes the target to become 
involved in “simulated” crimes. This description sanitizes the behaviour 
of the police: the accused is led to commit actual crimes. Hart is typical: 
among other things he delivered what he believed to be stolen credit 
cards.19 In fact, the contents of what he was delivering were not 
contraband, and so he could not be guilty of the completed offence. 
However, he would unambiguously be guilty of attempting to commit 
that offence.  
                                                                                                                                  
15  See Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 76, pointing to this problem. 
16  See for example R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (S.C.C.) and  
R. v. Broyles, [1991] S.C.J. No. 95, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595 (S.C.C.). 
17  R. v. Rose, discussed in Kouri Thomas Keenan, “Mr. Big”: Recruiting for the Criminal 
Underworld: An Examination of Undercover Police Investigations in Canada (Burnaby, B.C.: 
Simon Fraser University, 2009), at 6 [hereinafter “Keenan”]. 
18  Osmar, supra, note 14. See also the discussion in Lisa Dufraimont, “The Patchwork 
Principle against Self-Incrimination under the Charter” in Benjamin L. Berger & James 
Stribopoulos, eds., Unsettled Legacy: Thirty Years of Criminal Justice under the Charter (Markham, 
ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2012). 
19  Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 26. 
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His situation  and that of virtually all targets of Mr. Big  is 
identical to that in Dynar, where the accused tried to launder money which 
was not in fact the proceeds of crime.20 Dynar argued that he could not be 
guilty of an attempt to launder money, since in the circumstances it was 
“legally impossible” to do so. The Supreme Court rejected that argument: 
because Dynar believed what he was laundering to be the proceeds of 
crime, he was guilty of the attempt. Exactly the same would be true of 
Hart’s transporting of stolen credit cards, O.N.E.’s smuggling of cigarettes 
and selling of drugs, Mack’s laundering of money, Mentuck’s delivery of 
parcels, Bonisteel’s lookout work, Fliss’s assistance setting up a grow-op 
and smuggling of firearms, and so on: each would be guilty of attempt. 
Of course, no target of Mr. Big is ever charged with any of these 
offences: the only point is to lure the target in to the supposed criminal 
organization. Further, no accused could be successfully prosecuted for 
any of these offences: the circumstances constitute entrapment, in that 
the police will have actually induced the commission of the offence.21 
But the fact that the accused would have an entrapment defence does not 
make things better: it makes things worse!  
Consider why we have an entrapment defence. As the Court said in 
creating it: 
It is a deeply ingrained value in our democratic system that the ends do 
not justify the means. In particular, evidence or convictions may, at 
times, be obtained at too high a price.22 
Similarly: 
… there are inherent limits on the power of the state to manipulate 
people and events for the purpose of attaining the specific objective of 
obtaining convictions. These reasons and others support the view that 
there is a societal interest in limiting the use of entrapment techniques 
by the state.23 
Those interests do not disappear simply because the accused is charged 
with an offence other than that he was induced to commit. That is why 
entrapment leads, not to an acquittal, but to a stay: because the concerns 
have nothing to do with the accused’s guilt for the underlying offence, and 
everything to do with the objectionable behaviour of the police.  
                                                                                                                                  
20  R. v. Dynar, [1997] S.C.J. No. 64, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462 (S.C.C.). 
21  See R. v. Mack, [1988] S.C.J. No. 91, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903 (S.C.C.). 
22  Id., at para. 71. 
23  Id., at para. 76. 
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So causing the target to commit crimes is troublesome. Equally 
troublesome is the behaviour in which the police operatives themselves 
sometimes engage. It has included quite serious intrusions into the 
personal lives of targets: for example by attempting to have a target break 
up with his fiancée when she seemed to be an obstacle to his becoming 
involved in the criminal organization.24 It involves exploiting the 
loyalties of a target, for example by suggesting that the handler (the 
target’s close friend, as far as he or she knows) will suffer consequences 
if the target does not confess.25 It involves making use of drug treatment 
facilities as a means of introducing the undercover operative to the target, 
thus undermining the amount of confidence which can be placed in such 
organizations by those who rely on them.26 It involves making alcohol 
available to targets who are recovering alcoholics.27 All of this goes far 
beyond the sort of impact on a target’s life that other investigative 
techniques, including other undercover techniques, are likely to have. As 
Moore aptly put it: 
Mr. Big operatives purposefully infiltrate the suspect’s life. If the target 
has no friends, they provide some. If he has low self-esteem, they bolster 
his feelings of self worth. If he has no money, they supply it. If he has no 
long-term prospects, they hold out the expectation of steady work. If he is 
an alcoholic, they give him liquor. If he is naive and uncomfortable 
around women, an appreciative female friend is made available.28 
Finally, it should come as no surprise that this “Truman Show” 
approach has an impact that, at least sometimes, gives us pause. Perhaps 
the most striking impact is observable in Hart, in a fact not mentioned in 
the Supreme Court decision: that an amicus curiae had to be appointed for 
Hart at his initial appeal because he did not trust his legal counsel. 
Specifically, Hart suspected that lawyers appointed for him were 
participants in a further sting.29 In most people, we would see this as a kind 
of paranoia: in someone whose closest friends and entire social circle have 
turned out never to have been anything but a fraud, it is understandable 
caution. How can Hart, an already vulnerable and isolated individual, ever 
be expected to trust anyone for the rest of his life? 
                                                                                                                                  
24  R. v. Proulx, [2005] B.C.J. No. 272, 29 C.R. (6th) 136 (B.C.S.C.). 
25  R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76 (S.C.C.). 
26  Osmar, supra, note 14. 
27  R. v. Cretney, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2875 (B.C.S.C.). 
28  Moore, supra, note 3, at 381. 
29  R. v. Hart, [2009] N.J. No. 35, 242 C.C.C. (3d) 31 (N.L.C.A.). 
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III. THE HISTORY OF ABUSE OF PROCESS 
The history of the doctrine of abuse of process is a complex one, 
with significant developments outside of Hart in just the past couple of 
years. I will paint that history with broad brushstrokes: my goal, as 
stated, is to argue that there have been “trends” in the way that doctrine 
has been regarded, not to engage in a close analysis of every major case.  
I want to point to two lines of development. First, I will argue that 
the law has gone from providing no space for an abuse of process 
doctrine, to envisioning a fundamentally forward-looking remedy, and 
then eventually to having the real possibility of a backward-looking 
remedy. Second, I will point to an additional trend: that “abuse of 
process” and “stay of proceedings” were at first twinned questions, but 
have recently become separated. As a result, other remedies can now 
plausibly be considered after an abuse of process claim. This matters, 
since the issue in Mr. Big cases normally concerns only the admissibility 
of the confession, not an application for a stay. 
1.  Creating a Backward-looking Abuse of Process Doctrine 
I began this article by noting the objection to Mr. Big over a century 
ago in Todd: that the means employed were “contemptible” but that 
nothing could be done about that. It was a long time after that before an 
abuse of process doctrine existed in Commonwealth countries: the Court 
noted in its 1995 decision in O’Connor that the doctrine arrived in 
Canada in 1985 in Jewitt,30 and quoted that decision: 
I would adopt the conclusion of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Young, supra, and affirm that ‘there is a residual discretion in a trial 
court judge to stay proceedings where compelling an accused to stand 
trial would violate those fundamental principles of justice which 
underlie the community’s sense of fair play and decency and to prevent 
the abuse of a court’s process through oppressive and vexatious 
proceedings’. I would also adopt the caveat added by the Court in 
Young that this is a power which can be exercised only in the ‘clearest 
of cases’.31 
                                                                                                                                  
30  R. v. Jewitt, [1985] S.C.J. No. 53, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jewitt”]. 
31  R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 59 (S.C.C.) 
[herinafter “O’Connor”] (emphasis added). 
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This passage is relevant to the first line of development I want to 
note, in that it takes the law from having no abuse of process doctrine to 
having such a doctrine. However, that doctrine was, when formulated in 
Jewitt, an essentially forward-looking one. As the Court explained seven 
years after O’Connor, in Regan: 
Regardless of whether the abuse causes prejudice to the accused, 
because of an unfair trial, or to the integrity of the justice system, a stay 
of proceedings will only be appropriate when two criteria are met: 
(1)  the prejudice caused by the abuse in question will be manifested, 
perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by 
its outcome; and 
(2)  no other remedy is reasonably capable of removing that prejudice. 
[O’Connor, at para. 75] 
The Court’s judgment in Tobiass, at para. 91, emphasized that the first 
criterion is critically important. It reflects the fact that a stay of 
proceedings is a prospective rather than a retroactive remedy. A stay of 
proceedings does not merely redress a past wrong. It aims to prevent 
the perpetuation of a wrong that, if left alone, will continue to trouble 
the parties and the community as a whole, in the future.32 
The Court added “[t]he mere fact that the state has treated an 
individual shabbily in the past is not enough to warrant a stay of 
proceedings.”33 That is, the doctrine looked forward to see whether there 
will be mistreatment in the future: mistreatment in the past was of 
essentially no relevance. Obviously such an approach severely limited 
the ability of abuse of process as a doctrine to respond to Mr. Big, where 
the issue (other than concerns about the reliability of the statement made) 
is the past treatment of the accused. As the Court noted in Hart: 
... the doctrine of abuse of process — intended to protect against 
abusive state conduct — appears to be somewhat of a paper tiger. To 
date, it has never operated to exclude a Mr. Big confession, nor has it 
ever led to the stay of charges arising from one of these operations.34 
However, despite the stated prospectivity of the abuse of process 
doctrine, trial judges were inexorably drawn to apply it retrospectively.  
                                                                                                                                  
32  R. v. Regan, [2002] S.C.J. No. 14, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, 2002 SCC 12, at para. 54 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Regan”] (emphasis added). 
33  Id., at para. 55, quoting Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 82, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, at para. 91 [hereinafter “Tobiass”].  
34  Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 79. 
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In case after case, where excessive force was used in arrests, or humiliating 
strip searches were undertaken, or accused were detained gratuitously, trial 
judges found an abuse of process.35 As one trial judge noted: 
… In the present case the applicant complains about excessive force 
used by the police during his arrest. This is not a case where one could 
realistically say that any prejudice suffered by the applicant from that 
conduct would affect trial fairness and be ‘manifested, perpetuated or 
aggravated through the conduct of the trial.’ In his well-known text, 
Constitutional Remedies in Canada, Professor Kent Roach writes, at 
s.9.119, that in view of the decision in Regan and its predecessors, ‘it is 
difficult to imagine non-continuing misconduct that will warrant a stay 
of proceedings in order to protect judicial integrity’. 
Yet, that is not how trial courts are acting. …36 
This disconnect issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in 2012 
in Bellusci.37 That case falls squarely within the pattern of trial judgments 
that departed from the prospective approach: a guard “grievously 
assaulted” a prisoner while transporting him to a correctional facility. 
The prisoner was charged with various offences, but the trial judge 
entered a stay because of the guard’s behaviour. The Quebec Court of 
Appeal overturned that decision, on the basis that the prejudice would 
not be perpetuated or aggravated by holding a trial: that is, they held that 
the trial judge had granted a retrospective remedy when the test was a 
prospective one. 
The Supreme Court reversed that decision and restored the stay 
issued by the trial judge. They concluded that the trial judge had 
considered the proper factors, had made no reviewable error, and 
therefore was entitled to deference in the decision he had made about the 
appropriate remedy. Not only this trial judge, it seems, but many of those 
trial judges who thought they were acting contrary to the approach 
dictated by the Supreme Court turned out nonetheless to be in the right! 
                                                                                                                                  
35  See for example R. v. Fryingpan, [2005] A.J. No. 102, 373 A.R. 187, 2005 ABPC 28 
(Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Cheddie, [2006] O.J. No. 1585 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Merrick, [2007] O.J.  
No. 2266, 2007 ONCJ 260 (Ont. C.J.): R. v. Walcott, [2008] O.J. No. 1050, 57 C.R. (6th) 223 (Ont. 
S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Walcott”]; R. v. Knight, [2010] O.J. No. 3817, 79 C.R. (6th) 39 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. 
De Lima, [2010] O.J. No. 2673, 79 C.R. (6th) 82 (Ont. C.J.); and R. v. Bonds, [2010] O.J. No. 5034, 
79 C.R. (6th) 119 (Ont. C.J.). See also Tim Quigley, “Stays of Proceedings Due to Police 
Misconduct” (2011) 79 C.R. (6th) 124. 
36  Walcott, id., at paras. 123-124. 
37  R. v. Bellusci, [2012] S.C.J. No. 44, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 509, 2012 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Bellusci”]. 
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Strictly there was no change in the underlying law. Bellusci quotes 
the 1997 decision in Tobiass: 
As the Court explained in Tobiass, ‘if a past abuse were serious 
enough, then public confidence in the administration of justice could be 
so undermined that the mere act of carrying forward in the light of it 
would constitute a new and ongoing abuse sufficient to warrant a stay 
of proceedings’ (para. 96).38 
The point is not a change in the law so much as it is a change in the 
attitude to the law. That is, it had always been acknowledged that there was 
a “residual category” in which a retrospective remedy was theoretically 
available, but it had seemed so narrow as to be negligible.39 Bellusci, 
decided only two years before Hart, shows it to have some real teeth. 
2.  Creating a Range of Remedies for an Abuse of Process 
For much of the time that we have had an abuse of process doctrine 
it has not, analytically, been very separate from the question of a stay of 
proceedings. This need not have been the case, but as a matter of fact 
“was there an abuse of process” and “should a stay of proceedings be 
issued” were treated as the same question. The clearest evidence that this 
was the approach adopted by courts at the time is the academic 
commentary criticizing it. Lee Steusser argued that judges ought to be 
considering remedies other than a stay for an abuse of process.40 David 
Paciocco argued that two separate steps should be kept distinct: was there 
an abuse of process, and if so what would be the best remedy.41 
This conflation of the two questions has real consequences. A stay of 
proceedings is the big gun among remedies, and can only be granted in 
the “clearest of cases”.42 But if abuse of process and stay of proceedings 
are treated as the same question, then of course that amounts to saying 
                                                                                                                                  
38  Id., at para. 25. 
39  Kent Roach, “The Evolving Test for Stays of Proceedings” (1998) 40 Crim. L.Q. 400 
[hereinafter “Roach”], for example, criticized the 1997 Tobiass decision, noting at p. 400 that under it: 
The judicial integrity rationale is only a “residual category” that will rarely, if ever, be 
appropriate as a response to egregious but non-continuing misconduct. 
40  Lee Steusser, “Abuse of Process: The Need to Reconsider” (1994) 29 C.R. (4th) 92. 
41  David M. Paciocco, “The Stay of Proceedings as a Remedy in Criminal Cases: Abusing 
the Abuse of Process Concept” (1991) 15 Crim. L.J. 315 [hereinafter “Paciocco”]. See also Roach, 
supra, note 39, noting “Before O’Connor, a stay of proceedings was considered the only appropriate 
remedy for an abuse of process”, citing Graeme G. Mitchell, “Abuse of Process and the Crown’s 
Disclosure Obligation” (1996) 44 C.R. (4th) 130, at 136. 
42  See O’Connor, supra, note 31, at para. 59, quoted above at note 31. 
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that there can only be a finding of abuse of process in the clearest of 
cases. Setting that stringent standard has probably contributed to the 
result that no Mr. Big operation has ever been found to meet the abuse of 
process test. 
This situation has changed as well, however. First, the Court 
addressed this point with the 1995 decision in O’Connor, holding that the 
test for a stay was: 
(1)  the prejudice caused by the abuse in question will be manifested, 
perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its 
outcome; and 
(2)  no other remedy is reasonably capable of removing that 
prejudice.43 
This formulation, at least nominally, separates the questions of abuse 
and stay. However, this explicit separation of whether there was an abuse 
of process and what the remedy for that abuse should be had, as a matter 
of fact, less impact than it might. It occurs in the context of a discussion 
about the relationship between abuse of process and section 7 of the 
Charter,44 which concludes that, although there are roles for both, in 
essence the common law test and the constitutional test are the same. 
Most of the focus in O’Connor in fact concerns whether there was a 
violation of the accused’s rights under section 7, rather than looking at 
the abuse of process question. As a result O’Connor was therefore 
looking at the issue of a section 24(1) “appropriate and just” remedy for 
a Charter violation: it was not centrally about the availability of a 
common law stay for abuse of process. In particular it is not looking at 
the “residual category” of abuse, where it is possible there could be a 
backward-looking remedy. 
Much the same remained true for subsequent cases dealing with 
stays of proceedings. It is difficult to demonstrate that there has been a 
tendency not to employ in practice a rule which has been articulated in 
principle. However, virtually all Supreme Court cases following 
O’Connor were looking at section 7 violations rather than the common 
law rule,45 at circumstances with special rules such as entrapment,46 
                                                                                                                                  
43  Id., supra, note 31, at para. 75. The Court explicitly adopts this position from Paciocco’s 
article, supra, note 41. 
44  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
45  See for example R. v. Nasogaluak, [2010] S.C.J. No. 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, 2010 SCC 6 
(S.C.C.); Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] S.C.J. No. 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 
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found that the breach of the accused’s rights would not continue to be 
manifested in the trial and so no remedy was required,47 or implicitly 
seem to assume that the only option after finding an abuse of process is 
to order a stay of proceedings.48 The situation which is most relevant to 
this discussion  an abuse of process, considered retrospectively, with 
alternative remedies to a stay seriously considered  did not arise.49 
However, the Court’s latest pronouncement on abuse of process  at 
least, latest prior to Hart itself  came in Babos, decided only a few 
months prior. In that case, the Court articulated a new three-step test for 
deciding whether an accused should receive a stay as a remedy for an 
abuse of process: 
1)  There must be prejudice to the accused’s right to a fair trial or the 
integrity of the justice system that “will be manifested, perpetuated 
or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome” 
(Regan, at para. 54); 
2)  There must be no alternative remedy capable of redressing the 
prejudice; and  
3)  Where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is warranted 
after steps 1) and 2), the court is required to balance the interests in 
favour of granting a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and 
preserving the integrity of the justice system, against “the interest 
that society has in having a final decision on the merits” (id., at 
para. 57).50 
                                                                                                             
326, 2008 SCC 38 (S.C.C.); R. v. Taillefer; R. v. Duguay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307, 
2003 SCC 70 (S.C.C.); R. v. Carosella, [1997] S.C.J. No. 12, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 80 (S.C.C.); R. v. La, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 30, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 680 (S.C.C.); R. v. Wickstead, [1997] S.C.J. No. 17, [1997] 1 
S.C.R. 307 (S.C.C.). 
46  R. v. Pearson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 86, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 620 (S.C.C.). 
47  Tobiass, supra, note 33 and Regan, supra, note 32. 
48  R. v. Punko, [2012] S.C.J. No. 39, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 396, 2012 SCC 39 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Mahalingan, [2008] S.C.J. No. 64, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 316, 2008 SCC 63 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pan; R. v. 
Sawyer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344, 2001 SCC 42 (S.C.C.); United States of America 
v. Cobb, [2001] S.C.J. No. 20, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 587, 2001 SCC 19 (S.C.C.); R. v. Finn, [1997] S.C.J. 
No. 9, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 10 (S.C.C.); R. v. Curragh Inc., [1997] S.C.J. No. 33, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 537 
(S.C.C.). 
49  The closest situation would be R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.J. No. 11, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 217, 
at para. 43 (S.C.C.), where in a one paragraph discussion the Court described the actions of the 
Crown in engaging in questioning of prospective jurors in advance of the selection process as  
“a flagrant abuse of process”. There was no use whatsoever of the test from O’Connor, supra, note 31, 
in reaching this conclusion, and although the remedy actually given was a new trial rather than a 
stay, there is quite literally no explanation as to why that was the remedy given. 
50  R. v. Babos, [2014] S.C.J. No. 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309, 2014 SCC 16, at para. 32 (S.C.C.). 
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The second step of this test, as did the O’Connor test, specifically 
directs judges to consider what alternatives other than a stay might serve 
as a remedy for the prejudice suffered by the accused. In this case, 
however, the Court is speaking about common law abuse of process 
rather than a section 7 violation. Further, they are specifically 
contemplating the possible retrospective claim of abuse which can arise 
from the residual category. They say: 
Where the residual category is invoked, however, and the prejudice 
complained of is prejudice to the integrity of the justice system, 
remedies must be directed towards that harm. It must be remembered 
that for those cases which fall solely within the residual category, the 
goal is not to provide redress to an accused for a wrong that has been 
done to him or her in the past. Instead, the focus is on whether an 
alternate remedy short of a stay of proceedings will adequately 
dissociate the justice system from the impugned state conduct going 
forward.51 
Further, in Babos the claim for a stay based on alleged police collusion 
failed precisely because an alternative remedy was available: excluding 
the evidence in question.  
In Hart itself the Court relied on Babos to note that the abuse of 
process doctrine “provides trial judges with a wide discretion to issue a 
remedy — including the exclusion of evidence or a stay of proceedings — 
where doing so is necessary to preserve the integrity of the justice system 
or the fairness of the trial”.52 
Babos was criticized for making the remedy of a stay of proceedings 
more difficult to obtain than it already was.53 That claim is not incorrect, 
but it is the “glass half-empty” way of looking at the decision. The “glass 
half-full” approach to Babos is to see it as making other remedies, such 
as the exclusion of evidence which would be looked for as a response to 
Mr. Big, more readily available.  
In sum, then, the past 30 years of case law on abuse of process has 
seen two significant developments, each reaching fruition in the past 
couple of years: a greater willingness to use abuse of process as a remedy 
for past objectionable behaviour by the state, and a greater willingness to 
                                                                                                                                  
51  Id., at para. 39. 
52  Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 113 (emphasis added). 
53  H.A. Kaiser, “Babos: Further Narrowing Access to Stay of Proceedings Where the 
Integrity of the Judicial Process is Implicated” (2014) 8 C.R. (7th) 59; Tim Quigley, “Babos: 
Balancing Test Unnecessarily Restricts Residual Category for Stay as Abuse of Process” (2014) 8 
C.R. (7th) 55. 
(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) ABUSE OF PROCESS AND EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 429 
use the remedy of exclusion of evidence as a response to that 
objectionable behaviour. As noted in the introduction to this section, both 
of those developments put us in a better position to more sensibly 
respond to Mr. Big. 
IV. THE HISTORY OF EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
Once again this is an area I plan to paint with broad brushstrokes.  
I do not, for example, plan to trace the variations in the approach to 
excluding evidence under section 24(2) from Collins,54 through 
Stillman,55 to Grant.56 Instead, the trend I want to demonstrate relates 
specifically to the exclusion of evidence on grounds other than those in 
section 24(2). My suggestion is that we have gone from essentially no 
exclusion of evidence, to exclusion only under section 24(2), to a broader 
recognition of the ability to exclude evidence on other grounds. Since 
that is exactly what is required as a response to Mr. Big, this trend also 
better poises us to consider that technique in future. 
The starting point for this discussion is the Supreme Court decision 
in Wray.57 There have long been rules of admissibility for certain types of 
evidence, such as confessions or hearsay. However, those rules are based 
on reliability concerns: Wray addressed the different question of whether 
trial judges had a discretion to exclude evidence on the basis that “its 
admission would be calculated to bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute”.58 The particular issue arose from a confession given by the 
accused which was excluded on the basis that it was not voluntary and 
therefore not reliable. However, in the course of confessing, the accused 
had led the police to the place where he had disposed of a weapon. The 
trial judge had also excluded that evidence, even though no reliability 
concerns arose with regard to it, but the Supreme Court held that the 
judge had no such discretion to exclude evidence: “if it is relevant, it is 
admissible, and the court is not concerned with how it was obtained”.59 
While rejecting a “bring the administration of justice into disrepute” 
exclusionary power, the Court did hold out the possibility of a very 
                                                                                                                                  
54  R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.). 
55  R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.). 
56  R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, 2009 SCC 32 (S.C.C.). 
57  R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, [1971] S.C.R. 272 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wray”]. 
58  Id., at 287. 
59  Id., at 298. This particular quote is from the decision of Judson J., concurring with the 
majority opinion of Martland J. 
430 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
narrow exclusionary power for evidence which would operate “unfairly”. 
In this regard they held that:  
It is only the allowance of evidence gravely prejudicial to the accused, 
the admissibility of which is tenuous, and whose probative force in 
relation to the main issue before the court is trifling, which can be said 
to operate unfairly.60 
Nominally this creates a very narrow exclusionary power, as opposed 
to none at all. However, as far as I am able to determine, out of the 
hundreds of cases which have considered Wray, only two found that the 
circumstances met that stringent test and allowed for the exclusion of 
evidence.61 The Wray rule was, in its impact, that exclusion of evidence 
based on disapproval of the underlying state action was a dead letter. 
Of course Wray only remained the governing authority for 11 years, 
until the Charter was passed in 1982. Indeed, the Charter specifically 
reverses Wray, by creating in section 24(2) a discretionary exclusion 
power as a response to state action which could “bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute”, exactly the power rejected in Wray. 
That moves us along the path of the justice system’s willingness to 
exclude, but only to some extent. The first Charter case to consider the 
issue of exclusion of evidence, the 1985 decision in Therens,62 
established a different limitation on that remedy. Section 24 contains, of 
course, two remedial powers: the exclusion of evidence in section 24(2), 
but the ability to give any remedy which is “appropriate and just” under 
section 24(1). It was argued, in early Charter days, that both of these 
provisions allowed for exclusion. Therens found unequivocally that this 
was not the case: 
I am satisfied from the words of s. 24 that s. 24(2) was intended to be 
the sole basis for the exclusion of evidence because of an infringement 
or a denial of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter. It is clear, 
in my opinion, that in making explicit provision for the remedy of 
exclusion of evidence in s. 24(2), following the general terms of 
s. 24(1), the framers of the Charter, intended that this particular remedy 
should be governed entirely by the terms of s. 24(2).63 
                                                                                                                                  
60  Id., at 293. 
61  The two cases are R. v. Darwin, [1973] B.C.J. No. 771, 13 C.C.C. (2d) 432 (B.C.C.A.) 
and R. v. MacLean, [1975] B.C.J. No. 1017, 27 C.C.C. (2d) 57 (B.C. Cty. Ct.). 
62  R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Therens”]. 
63  Id., at para. 60, per Le Dain J., dissenting in the result but speaking for the majority on 
this point.  
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No matter how unequivocal Therens was on this point, however,  
10 years later the Court moved forward another step on the road to 
greater exclusionary power, and found the ability to exclude evidence 
under section 24(1) after all. Indeed, in the 1995 Harrer decision the 
Court really took two steps forward at once.64 
Harrer concerned evidence which was gathered without compliance 
with the accused’s Charter rights: however, that gathering occurred 
outside the country and so the Charter did not apply. Since the evidence 
had therefore not been “obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any 
rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter”, exclusion of evidence 
was not available under section 24(2). Nonetheless the Court articulated 
two separate bases upon which exclusion might be possible nonetheless. 
Chief Justice McLachlin held in a concurring opinion: 
Evidence not obtained in breach of the Charter but the admission of 
which may undermine the right to a fair trial may be excluded under  
s. 24(1), which provides for “such remedy as the court considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances” for Charter breaches.65 
In contrast, La Forest J. held for the majority that, if exclusion were 
called for, it would be for other reasons: 
I would not take this step under s. 24(2), which is addressed to the 
rejection of evidence that has been wrongfully obtained. Nor would I 
rely on s. 24(1), under which a judge of competent jurisdiction has the 
power to grant such remedy to a person who has suffered a 
Charter breach as the court considers just and appropriate. Rather, I 
would reject the evidence on the basis of the trial judge’s duty, now 
constitutionalized by the enshrinement of a fair trial in the Charter, to 
exercise properly his or her judicial discretion to exclude evidence that 
would result in an unfair trial.66 
Harrer recognized in principle the possibility of excluding evidence other 
than through section 24(2), though it did not do so in practice: the evidence 
was not excluded. 
It is arguable Harrer recognized three new ways to exclude evidence, 
since La Forest J.’s rationale can be understood in two ways. On the one 
hand we might say that, if admitting evidence would violate the Charter, 
                                                                                                                                  
64  R. v. Harrer, [1995] S.C.J. No. 81, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harrer”]. 
65  Id., at para. 42. Although McLachlin J. (as she then was) said this in a concurring 
judgment, it has been acted upon by other courts as an accurate statement of the law: see for example 
R. v. Jageshur, [2002] O.J. No. 4108, 8 C.R. (6th) 67 (Ont. C.A.). 
66  Harrer, supra, note 64, at para. 21. 
432 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
then a trial judge should avoid violating the Charter at all by not admitting 
the evidence.67 Alternatively, we might say that the basis for exclusion is 
not the Charter at all, but a common law power to exclude evidence. 
It was in this latter way that McLachlin C.J.C. primarily described 
the power in her concurring judgment.68 In essence that same approach 
was subsequently adopted by a unanimous Court eight years further on 
with the 2003 decision in Buhay, where it was held that: 
... even in the absence of a Charter breach, judges have a discretion at 
common law to exclude evidence obtained in circumstances such that it 
would result in unfairness if the evidence was admitted at trial, or if the 
prejudicial effect of admitting the evidence outweighs its probative 
value.69  
This is subtly different from Harrer. The earlier case could have 
been read as suggesting that the common law had changed on this point 
since the passage of the Charter: the latter is saying that, independent of 
the Charter, the common law has long provided a broad-based power for 
trial judges to exclude evidence. One might be forgiven for seeing that as 
rewriting history.70 
The last case to be looked at here is the 2009 decision in Bjelland,71 
where the Court returned to the question of exclusion of evidence as a 
remedy under section 24(1). In this case the issue was not whether such a 
remedy was available under that section: it was when. Specifically the 
issue in that case was whether late disclosure of evidence could result in 
the exclusion of that evidence.72 All seven judges hearing the case agreed 
that in principle such an order was available under section 24(1): they 
disagreed in a four to three split over the test which should govern 
granting that remedy, and whether the remedy had been properly granted 
by the trial judge. 
                                                                                                                                  
67  This is the way in which the situation seems to be understood in R. v. Terry, [1996] S.C.J. 
No. 62, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.), for example. 
68  See Harrer, supra, note 64, at para. 41. Chief Justice McLachlin supports this conclusion 
by relying on a broad interpretation of Kuruma v. The Queen, [1955] A.C. 197. Kuruma was the case 
argued unsuccessfully in support of exclusion in Wray, supra, note 57: the Court in that decision had 
held that the case had to be given an extremely narrow interpretation. 
69  R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, 2003 SCC 30, at para. 40 (S.C.C.). 
70  My skepticism on this point is not idiosyncratic. See for example Michael C. Plaxton, 
“Who Needs Section 24(2)? Or: Common Law Sleight-of-Hand” (2003) 10 C.R. (6th) 236. 
71  R. v. Bjelland, [2009] S.C.J. No. 38, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 651, 2009 SCC 38 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Bjelland”]. 
72  There had been no Charter violation in obtaining the evidence in question, and so s. 24(2) 
was not applicable. 
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Justice Rothstein for the majority relied, as it happened, on two cases 
already discussed here: O’Connor and Harrer. Based on those cases he 
concluded that evidence could be excluded where its admission would 
render the trial unfair or “where exclusion is necessary to maintain the 
integrity of the justice system”.73 He elaborated that: 
The exclusion of evidence may also be an appropriate and just remedy 
where the Crown has withheld evidence through deliberate misconduct 
amounting to an abuse of process.74 
Justice Fish, in dissent, finds the majority’s position too restrictive. 
Specifically he objects that the majority’s test for exclusion of evidence 
under section 24(1) relies on “the same exacting standard that until now 
has been uniquely reserved for a far more drastic remedy — a stay of 
proceedings”.75 
The majority’s test in Bjelland has been criticized for making 
exclusion too difficult to obtain under section 24(1).76 It is undeniably true 
that Bjelland  at least in the context of late disclosure  makes 
exclusion of evidence under section 24(1) less available than it might have 
been. Once again, however, we can regard that as the “glass half-full” way 
to regard the situation. For the particular purposes of this article, Bjelland 
can be seen as bringing about a convergence. Just as the abuse of process 
case law reached the point of saying “where there is objectionable state 
conduct, evidence can be excluded”, so the exclusion of evidence case law 
reached the point of saying “where there is objectionable state conduct, 
evidence can be excluded”. And that placed us exactly where we needed to 
be to begin to discuss Mr. Big’s ability to weave a path through all the 
law’s exclusionary rules, and whether to exclude simply because of that, 
without the need for another reliability-based rule. 
                                                                                                                                  
73  Bjelland, supra, note 71, at para. 24. 
74  Id., at para. 27. 
75  Id., at para. 45. 
76  Paul Calarco, “R. v. Bjelland: No Effective Remedy for Crown Failure to Disclose” 
(2009) 67 C.R. (6th) 219. See also David M. Paciocco, “Section 24(2): Lottery or Law — The 
Appreciable Limits of Purposive Reasoning” (2011) 58 Crim. L.Q. 15, noting that it proceeds under 
different assumptions about the relevant considerations than does the analysis under s. 24(2). 
434 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
V. THE PATH FORWARD: PURSUING THE  
ABUSE OF PROCESS PRONG 
As noted at the start, my thesis is that evaluating Mr. Big by looking 
at it as possible misconduct is the approach that future cases should focus 
on. Let me conclude, therefore, by explaining why we should prefer that 
second prong to the new reliability-based rule. 
First, focusing too much on the precise dictates of particular 
reliability-based rules is what created the problem in the first place. We 
tend to think of Hart as having created a “Mr. Big Rule”.77 But the 
presence of a purported ring leader  i.e., the existence of Mr. Big 
personally  is not essential. Hart incriminated himself before he ever 
met Mr. Big. If we take the Supreme Court in Hart and Mack to have 
formulated a “Mr. Big Rule” then we simply encourage the police to create 
a new technique which avoids the strictures of that rule, just as Mr. Big 
avoids the confessions, admissions against interest, party admissions, 
right to silence, right against self-incrimination and entrapment rules. 
Hart, to its credit, foresees this danger: 
This rule targets Mr. Big operations in their present form. A change in 
the way the police use undercover operations to elicit confessions may 
escape the scope of this rule. However, it is not for this Court to 
anticipate potential developments in policing. To do so would be 
speculative. Time will tell whether, in a future case, the principles that 
underlie this rule warrant extending its application to another context.78 
Further, the actual rule created in Hart does not insist on a crime boss as 
part of the scheme. Rather the rule states: 
Where the state recruits an accused into a fictitious criminal organization 
of its own making and seeks to elicit a confession from him, any 
confession made by the accused to the state during the operation should 
be treated as presumptively inadmissible.79  
However, that does not make the reliability-based rule sufficient to meet 
future needs. 
Consider R. v. Derbyshire.80 The police believed the accused to be an 
accessory after the fact to a murder committed by her boyfriend, and to 
                                                                                                                                  
77  See for example Lisa Dufraimont, “R. v. Hart: Standing Up to Mr. Big” (2014) 12 C.R. 
(6th) 294. 
78  Hart, supra, note 1, footnote 5 in the decision. 
79  Id., at para. 85. 
80  R. v. Derbyshire, [2014] N.S.J. No. 689, 353 N.S.R. (2d) 40, 2014 NSSC 371 (N.S.S.C.). 
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have assisted him in concealing the offence and escaping. Two 
undercover officers claimed to be Montreal-based outlaw motorcycle 
gang members who were associates of her boyfriend, there to “clean up” 
the mistake which was adversely affecting their business. The two large 
men, strangers to the accused and dressed as gang members, approached 
her aggressively in a dimly-lit underground parking garage and said 
“Brittany, jump in the fucking car. I need to fucking talk to you.” Within 
a few minutes, she had given significant information to the two police 
officers about the murder and her involvement in it, including drawing 
them two maps: ultimately she drove with them for hours, showing them 
places where evidence could be found. Nothing in this approach hinges 
on recruiting the target to join a fictitious criminal organization, but 
nonetheless it ought to give us pause.81  
If we focus particularly on whether the undercover officers try to 
recruit the target, we could continue to miss the point. Any concerns 
about Mr. Big must lead to a response to more than just Mr. Big.  
Second, reliability-based rules run into the admissibility/weight 
problem. I cannot summarize this issue better than David Tanovich has:  
Historically, reliability has often been treated as a question going to 
weight rather than admissibility. So, for example, in R. v. Hodgson, 
Justice Cory observed that ‘the quality, weight or reliability of evidence 
is a matter for the jury, and that the admission of evidence which may 
be unreliable does not per se render a trial unfair: see, e.g., R. v. Buric 
(1996), 28 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.); aff’d [1997] 1 S.C.R. 535, and R. v. 
Charemski, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 679’.82 
The tendency of courts is to admit the confession and invite the 
accused to argue to the jury why it should not be given much weight.83 
Particularly given the additional reluctance of courts to refuse to admit 
evidence about the “false confession” phenomenon,84 the first prong in 
Hart is not the most promising for the future.  
                                                                                                                                  
81  The trial judge found an abuse of process analogous to the possibility outlined in Hart, 
supra, note 1. 
82  David Tanovich, “R. v. Hart: A Welcome New Emphasis on Reliability and 
Admissibility” (2012) 12 C.R. (7th) 298, at 299. 
83  Osmar, supra, note 14. 
84  See for example Osmar, supra, note 14. See the discussion of false confessions and of 
expert evidence in Moore, supra, note 3, and in Steven M. Smith, Veronica Stinson & Marc W. 
Patry, “Using the “Mr. Big” Technique to Elicit Confessions: Successful Innovation or Dangerous 
Development in the Canadian Legal System?” (2009) Psychology, Public Policy and Law Vol. 15(3) 
168 [hereinafter “Smith”], at 170. See also R. v. Pearce, [2014] M.J. No. 202, 310 Man. R. (2d) 14, 
2014 MBCA 70 (Man. C.A.), though it is not a Mr. Big case. 
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Third, there is other cause to be less-than-optimistic about how 
successful arguments under the reliability-based first prong will be. The 
Court in Hart held that two sets of factors should be looked at to decide 
whether to admit the confession: “the circumstances in which the 
statement was made” and “whether there is any confirmatory evidence”.85  
The Court in Hart pointed to a number of circumstances that could be 
considered, such as the length of the operation, the relationship between 
the undercover officers and the accused, and the age, sophistication and 
mental health of the accused, among other things.86 Clearly the Court is 
suggesting that there is a range of circumstances, some only mildly 
coercive, others very coercive. That is of course true, but we should not 
draw the wrong conclusion from the existence of that range. The range 
only describes the extent to which the circumstances undermine the 
reliability of the confession: sometimes a great deal, sometimes only a 
little bit. But the circumstances of a Mr. Big investigation should not invite 
us to think “that makes the accused’s statement more reliable”. The target 
of a Mr. Big sting is always being given a motive to claim, truly or falsely, 
to have committed a crime. The fact that on some occasions there is only a 
small extraneous motive to give the statement means the reliability is only 
undermined to a small degree: it does not enhance reliability. 
Nonetheless the way the Court describes this consideration in Hart 
suggests that they believe the circumstances could sometimes enhance 
reliability, and indeed that seems to be exactly what they conclude in 
Mack. The probative value was found to be high precisely because the 
monetary inducement were “modest”, he was not threatened and he only 
needed to confess if he wanted to advance from the “third line” to the 
greater rewards of the first line. These factors only amount to saying 
Mack was given a small inducement to confess, not a large inducement. 
None of them are factors which point away from an inducement. 
Things are little better when it comes to the second way of enhancing 
reliability, the existence of confirmatory evidence. Certainly it is possible 
that there could be confirmatory evidence. The Court in Hart, for 
example, points to a confession which contains details which have not 
been released to the public. That would certainly constitute confirmation. 
However, in Mack, the Court finds that the confession was confirmed 
by two things. First, Mack had previously made the same statements he 
made to Mr. Big to others. However, that argument should be suspect, 
                                                                                                                                  
85  Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 101. 
86  Id., at para. 102. 
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since it runs directly contrary to the rationale for the rule against prior 
consistent statements: “it is impermissible to assume that because a 
witness has made the same statement in the past, he or she is more likely 
to be telling the truth”.87  
The other “confirmatory” evidence was that shell casings and the 
victim’s body were found in the place to which the accused led the 
police. In the abstract that is potentially confirmatory. However, saying 
the evidence should therefore be admitted comes uncomfortably close to 
re-establishing the pre-Charter position on exclusion of evidence set out 
in Wray. In Wray the accused gave a statement which was not admissible, 
but also led the police to the place where the weapon could be found: the 
result was that the weapon and the portions of the statement dealing with 
the weapon were admissible. In Mack, because of similar confirmation, 
not only parts of his statement but his entire statement was admitted. 
That risks reinstituting Wray’s “if it is relevant, it is admissible, and the 
court is not concerned with how it was obtained”88 approach, which has 
properly been rebuffed. 
I do not suggest the Court is unaware of this danger.89 Aware or not, 
however, it is a danger, and one the Court arguably fell prey to in Mack. 
Despite suggesting in Hart that judges might prefer to begin with the 
abuse of process question,90 the Court does not follow that approach in 
either Hart or Mack. I suggest they ought to have, because of my final 
reason for suggesting that the abuse of process prong is the line to follow 
in future: it engages more directly with the fundamental objections to  
Mr. Big.  
The usual “success rate” for obtaining a confession through Mr. Big 
is quoted as 75 per cent.91 What that means is that one quarter of those 
subjected to the technique have had a fictitious world created, have been 
led to commit crimes, have been part of a scheme in which the police 
created the impression of violence and intimidation  and all for no 
reason whatsoever. Where no confession is ever made, there is no 
possibility of assessing the probative value against the prejudice: 
however, if the police went too far in what they did, they went too far 
whether it produced a confession or not.  
                                                                                                                                  
87  R. v. Stirling, [2008] S.C.J. No. 10, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 272, 2008 SCC 10, at para. 7 (S.C.C.). 
88  Wray, supra, note 57, at 298. 
89  Hart, supra, note 1, says at para. 112 “It should not, however, be taken as suggesting that 
police misconduct will be forgiven so long as a demonstrably reliable confession is ultimately secured.” 
90  Hart, supra, note 1, at para. 89. 
91  Keenan, supra, note 17, at 17; Smith, supra, note 84, at 170. 
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Put another way, we should not focus too centrally on the risk of false 
confessions, which is sometimes presented as the main problem. The 
behaviour which produces false confessions is undeniably unacceptable  
but it is just as unacceptable whether it produces a confession or not. 
Imagine if, after living for months in the fantasy world the police created 
for him, Hart had nonetheless insisted that his daughters had died in a 
tragic accident: it would still have been wrong for the police to do what 
they did, and it would still be an abuse of process.92 The prong of the Hart 
analysis which looks at the real issue is the abuse of process one, and so 
that is the question to which the greatest attention should be paid in future. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I suggested at the start that it is hard to say something new about  
Mr. Big. When it was first discussed it was pronounced “contemptible”93 
and in the intervening years every imaginable rule-based objection was 
made to it, without success  until Hart. But Hart did not find 
something new to say about the technique by accident: rather, it was a 
product of the trends in law which had led up to it.  
The problem with the Mr. Big technique has never been that it does 
not comply with the technical rules of the system: the problem is that it is 
designed to evade those rules and game that system. It follows the letter 
of the rules while snubbing its nose at the spirit of them. Creating an 
additional specific rule is unlikely to solve that problem, because that 
approach plays the game at which Mr. Big is already a master.  
What is needed instead is a meta-rule, a rule which steps outside the 
system to address directly the spirit of what the police have done. 
Developments in other areas of the law have made it easier for courts to 
look backward and assess whether police behaviour was unacceptable, 
and have made it easier for courts to conclude that exclusion of evidence 
on general policy grounds is a realistic option. Because of that the 
Supreme Court was, in Hart, able to reinvigorate the abuse of process 
doctrine, and to give the possibility of real teeth to the paper tiger.  
Perhaps, finally, we can now say something new. 
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